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Voluntary environmental agreements have been popular with government agencies in 
several countries.  However, many questions remain about their efficiency as a regulatory 
tool.  Recent analyses suggest that they are more effective than conventional regulatory or 
economic approaches when dealing with diffuse pollution and when innovation processes at 
the source are necessary to define effective regulation.  This paper applies an activity-based 
framework to assess the contribution of such a voluntary agreement to the environmental 
performance of farms participating in a whole farm plan in the Southern part of Belgium.  
Using a cross-section of 52 farms, our results show that farms entering into environmental 
agreements are environmentally more efficient than non-participating farms in terms of the 
preservation and provision of landscape features.  However, their environmental efficiency 
with regard to the reduction of non-desirable outputs, such as organic nitrogen, is mostly 
determined by technical efficiency and not by participation in the whole farm plan. 
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Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms 
1.  Introduction 
Governments have become increasingly interested and involved in voluntary environmental 
agreements regulating different sectors of the economy.  The Fifth European Program of 
Action adopted in 1992 proposed this new approach to environmental policy and by 1996, 
more than 300 voluntary agreements (VAs) have been created in the European Union (Aggeri, 
1999).  Governments’ interest in this approach is justified by its potential to reduce the 
increasing administrative costs of direct regulation, by the political difficulties in introducing 
taxes and permit systems, and by the support VAs receive from industry groups (Carraro and 
Lévêque, 1999).   
A large number of voluntary programs can also be found in agriculture. These programs 
seek to reduce negative externalities, such as nitrate and pesticide leaching into groundwater, 
as well as to pose incentives to maintain and improve the provision of public goods, such as 
ecologically important landscape elements.  Voluntary approaches have been deemed 
appropriate for the regulation of environmental impacts of agriculture because of the nonpoint 
source character of many pollution problems.  In addition, agriculture has a long history of 
public support in the development and diffusion of new technologies as documented by the 
important role that governments attribute to agricultural programs and extension services. 
The growing interest in voluntary agreements calls for an assessment of their efficiency 
in improving environmental impacts.  Hanley et al. (1999) point to the need to develop 
methods evaluating the environmental achievements of stewardship programs.  This exercise 
may be simple when program objectives are uni-dimensional, for example when protecting a 
single endangered species.  However, many environmental programs in agriculture are not 
only concerned with one precise environmental variable but tackle several issues at once.   
This makes it difficult to measure their success in achieving their multiple objectives.   
Some papers have assessed the success of agri-environmental programs by analyzing the 
adoption of environmentally sound production practices (e.g., Lichtenberg et al., 1993).  
However, little research has been done in order to assess the achievement of general 
environmental performance objectives. Environmental performance and efficiency of a given 
production activity may be measured by agri-environmental farm indicators (see for example 
OECD, 2001) or by activity-based analysis, i.e., data envelope analysis (DEA).  The latter 
approach allows to overcome problems associated with the aggregation of several 
environmental indicators (Tyteca, 1997).  It takes into account the technical efficiency of 
resource use and can be extended to account for the production of weakly disposable outputs 
and non-market amenities.   
The objective of this paper is to analyze the environmental performance and efficiency of 
farms participating in a voluntary public scheme encouraging environmentally friendly 
agricultural practices.  Showing that a VA improves the environmental performance and 
efficiency of participating farms is certainly not sufficient to prove its overall economic 
efficiency.  This would require a more detailed analysis of costs and benefits.   However, 
observable improvements in the environmental performance of participating farms are a 
necessary condition for any effective environmental policy tool.   3
The VA of our choice is the whole farm plan (WFP) that has been proposed to farmers in 
Wallonia, Belgium, since the introduction of the agri-environmental stewardship programs 
according to EU regulation 2078/92 in 1994. Using a collection of agri-environmental 
indicators and DEA, we compare a sample composed of farms having established a plan to a 
sample of farms not having subscribed to the program.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  First we give an overview of the 
literature on voluntary environmental agreements.  We introduce, in section 3, the WFP 
implemented in southern Belgium.  Then we introduce the methods and the data collection 
procedure.  Results are discussed in section 5.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of our findings. 
2.  Voluntary Agreements  
The term “voluntary agreements” refers to a multitude of environmental policy approaches.  
In this section we review the main features of the literature on VAs. 
2.1. Definition and types 
VAs are hybrids between traditional “Command and Control” policies and horizontal non-
regulatory measures, and have been linked to other instruments such as legislation, taxes, and 
subsidies (European Commission, 1997).  In voluntary approaches, firms commit to improve 
their environmental performance exceeding legal requirements.  VAs can be classified into 
four categories (Carraro and Lévêque, 1999).  Unilateral commitments are environmental 
improvement programs set up by firms and communicated to their members (employees, 
shareholders, clients, etc.), whereas negotiated agreements provide contracts between public 
authorities and firms that prescribe a target and a time limit to accomplish it.  Covenants 
negotiate agreements establishing rules of implementation to meet targets. This type of VA 
has different purposes, ranging from studying a particular issue to reaching a specific 
environmental goal through binding or voluntary agreements (e.g., the Dutch energy 
efficiency covenants).  Lastly, public voluntary schemes are general frameworks and 
standards voluntarily adopted by individual firms.  These types of agreements define 
compliance conditions and monitoring and evaluation criteria.  In response, participating 
firms receive economic benefits in form of R&D subsidies, technical assistance, and certified 
environmental reputation, such as in the Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS) 
implemented in the EU since 1993.  The whole farm plan studied in this paper is of this public 
voluntary scheme type. 
2.2. Efficiency of voluntary agreements  
In response to the rising interest in VAs by public decision-makers and industry, economists 
have become increasingly involved in the analysis of VAs.  At first sight, it seems puzzling 
that public decision makers are willing to form VAs with polluting firms because such 
arrangements may give considerable negotiating power to the firms or to the industry to be 
regulated.  But moral hazard prevailing in environmental regulation might be better dealt with 
on a “cooperative” basis and transaction and monitoring cost could substantially be reduced.  
Indeed, public decision makers preserve their negotiation power by credible legislative threats 
of stricter mandatory regulation in the case that the environmental goals fixed in VAs are not 
achieved (Segerson and Miceli, 1998).    4
The environmental efficiency of VAs is much debated.  They may improve a firm’s 
public image and leave more flexibility to firms in achieving environmental goals and thus 
provide cost reduction possibilities with respect to compliance, administrative, and transaction 
costs (Börkey et al., 1999).  Despite this flexibility and the resulting cost reductions, VAs may 
not be efficient in achieving an environmental standard for two reasons: Firms have the 
possibility to disrespect their commitments and firms may declare an easy target to reach 
(Carraro & Lévêque, 1999).  As a result, VAs may lead to a watering down of environmental 
standards and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms may not be reliable.  In badly 
designed VAs, free-rider problems may prevail, such that the agreements lack credibility in 
public opinion and are not be accepted by non-government organisations (Lévêque, 1997).  
Binding agreements provide more guaranties for reaching environmental standards (Lefèvre, 
2000).  The success of non-binding agreements depends then on the simultaneous existence of 
a credible threat of stricter legislation and correct incentives encouraging firms to participate.     
VAs will be efficient in defining an appropriate environmental quality standard if these 
non-binding programs are used as a complement to other regulatory tools rather than as a 
substitute of them. A good example is the Danish scheme on greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction that includes a financial support in form of investment grants and CO2 rebates 
(Lefèvre, 2000).  According to Aggeri (1999), VAs also represent an appropriate way for 
developing and monitoring innovation.  
In particular, Aggeri (1999) considers that the use of VAs can be justified in cases of 
nonpoint source pollution, where a large number of heterogeneous actors is involved, the 
number of transformation stages is significant, and the level of uncertainty is high.  In these 
cases, strong coordination mechanisms are required in setting quantitative objectives and in 
designating responsibilities, know-how transfer rules, and monitoring schemes.  VAs can 
provide such mechanisms, even if they provide lower incentives for abatement than other 
economic instruments.  
2.3. VA as a stimulus for innovation  
VAs can reduce compliance and transaction costs by allowing polluters flexibility in the 
choice of technology through which environmental performance targets are met.  In several 
cases, this flexibility may stimulate innovation. By being first in adopting and developing new 
technologies, firms participating in VAs can push for tightened regulation that increases their 
compliance cost by less than its competitors’ costs.  The ‘environmental’ innovators may 
hence improve their strategic position in the industry (Salop and Scheffman, 1983, Videras 
and Alberini, 2000).  
It has been observed that innovation at the source is an important process for improving 
environmental conditions.  For example in the last decades in the Netherlands, agriculture has 
rapidly progressed and has frequently resorted to innovations (David et al., 2000).  The Dutch 
government has contributed to this success by investing in research, education, and extension, 
but it has also understood that delegating more authority and responsibility to firms reduces 
public expenses and increases the environmental involvement of firms.  
3. The Walloon Whole Farm Plan 
The agricultural administration of the Walloon region has proposed an environmental whole 
farm plan (WFP) to farmers since 1994.  This plan is part of the environmental stewardship 
programs introduced in Belgium according to the EU regulation 2078/92.  In transposing this   5
regulation, the Walloon region distinguishes between the region as a whole and areas of 
particular environmental statute, such as those facing difficulties of meeting the objectives set 
out in the EU nitrate directive (91/676/CEE) and those being protected under the statute of a 
natural park. There are six horizontal agri-environmental programs that are accessible to 
farmers independent of location and five vertical programs only accessible in the 
environmentally sensitive areas.  The latter encourage reduction of inputs in cereal and maize 
production, plantation of winter green cover crops, very extensive pasture management, and 
the protection of wetlands.  The horizontal programs proposed without area restriction and 
thus applicable to the whole region support extensive pasture management, extensive field 
margins, the maintenance of hedges, fruit trees, and wetlands, and the reduction of livestock 
densities.  During the period from March 1999 to December 2000, vertically restricted 
programs could be adopted outside the sensitive zones if farmers agreed to subscribe to at 
least three programs and if they subscribed at the same time to an environmental whole farm 
management plan.
1   
The WFP consists of a description of the farm and its production activities, and examines 
the farm’s environmental approach in seven categories: (1) the application of the good 
agricultural practice; (2) application of new and improved cultural practices; (3) control of 
technical material (pesticide sprayer, effluent applicators, etc.); (4) pest management; (5) 
plant nutrition management; (6) effluent storage; and ( 7) nature protection and landscape 
integration.  The plan is prepared in collaboration between the farmer and the regional 
administration and the assessment of current farm practices leads to the definition of short-
term (1 year), medium-term (5 years), and long-term objectives.  Progress towards these 
objectives is to be reviewed regularly (annually) and objectives can be adapted to take 
changes into account.  The WFP consists of a five-year contract.  This is consistent with the 
commitment period of the other agri-environmental programs that farmers can subscribe to. 
The focus of the whole farm plan lies explicitly in improving the overall environmental 
approach of the participating farm.  As it was mandatory for certain stewardship programs, 
farms particularly interested in these vertical programs have enrolled.  For instance, one of the 
vertical programs subsidizes the plantation of winter cover crops at 100 Euro/ha, and many 
farmers with large acreage in spring crops (in particular maize, potatoes, and sugar beets) are 
interested in this program.  The establishment of the plan itself or the achievement of the fixed 
objectives was not an object of remuneration in itself. Participation was hence mostly based 
on negative incentives, because the plan was necessary to access some of the agri-
environmental subsidies (Ervin and Smith, 1996).  Positive incentives, for example related to 
training and education, have rarely been a motive to establish the plan.  Until the end of 1999, 
about 4 - 5% of the eligible farms outside the zones of particular environmental statute have 
subscribed to the WFP.   
4.  The measurement of environmental performance 
We employ two approaches to measure the environmental performance of farms.  First we use 
a set of agri-environmental indicators developed by the Walloon administration.  The problem 
with this type of indicators is that it is difficult to globally assess the environmental impacts.  
Indicators are more or less focused on one particular aspect of environmental protection and 
one particular aspect is often addressed from different angles by different indicators.  For 
                                             
1 The stewardship programs have been revised in response to EC 1257/1999 and are now part of the Walloon 
Rural Development Plan.  The whole farm plan is no longer mandatory to qualify for any of the vertical or 
horizontal stewardship programs.   6
example, an indicator on nitrogen fertilization per hectare deals with questions of soil and 
water protection, and is often complemented by indicators analyzing the equilibrium of 
organic matters on agricultural land or measuring the animal stocking density. 
When analyzing the global environmental performance of farms, the indicator method 
encounters problems when it comes to aggregation issues.  How to weigh different indicators 
in the aggregation and how to account for the technical efficiency of production?  Methods, 
such as ecopoints employed in lower Austria to calculate stewardship subsidies (Van 
Huylenbroeck and Whitby, 1999), are criticized for arbitrarily aggregating different 
indicators.  While problematic, aggregation of indicators is an important issue.  Especially if 
programs and farms are to be evaluated on their environmental contributions to landscape 
management and pollution reduction, an overall performance indicator is necessary.   We thus 
use in a second instance data envelope analysis (DEA) in order to calculate an overall index 
of environmental efficiency.  DEA or activity analysis allows evaluating the efficiency of 
farms by calculating weights that compare each individual farm to the entire sample.  The 
envelopment is formed from the input-output data of the sample as its convex, weakly 
disposable hull of efficient observations. 
4.1  Agri-environmental indicators 
The agri-environmental indicators evaluated in this study are those developed by the Walloon 
administration in order to evaluated the environmental performance of farms.  Table 1 
provides a list of the indicators used.  They can be grouped into a set of indicators measuring 
the adoption of practices aimed at reducing the environmental intensity, and thus improving 
the degree of soil and water protection, and a second set of indicators evaluating the provision 
of desirable environmental services, such as landscape amenities.  This classification is not 
unambiguous as some indicators relate to both aspects.  The table shows in columns 2-4 a 
range of benchmark values according to which an indicator is considered signifying low, 
medium, and high environmental benefits. 
4.2 Data envelopment analysis measuring environmental efficiency 
Recent studies have used DEA to evaluate not only technical and economic efficiency but 
also environmental efficiency.  This extension goes back to Färe et al. (1989) who include 
weakly disposable inputs in the technology.  Färe et al. (1996) propose an indicator of the 
environmental performance that is based on the separability of the distance function. 
Tyteca (1997) has used this method to form an indicator of environmental performance 
for electricity companies using a production technology characterized by a set of inputs, 
weakly disposable, nondesirable outputs, and strongly disposable, desirable outputs.  He 
proposes three different indicators.  The first efficiency measure considers only the reduction 
in undesirable, not freely disposable inputs.  The second evokes a proportional reduction in 
inputs and undesirable outputs.  And the third does no longer consider inputs in the 
technology description and considers the reduction in nondesirable outputs for a given level of 
desirable outputs.  Ball et al. (1994) and Piot-Lepetit and Le Moing (2000) apply similar 
methods in the agricultural context. 
In our application, we introduce in addition to weakly disposable undesirable outputs also 
desirable non-market outputs, i.e., amenities. These include the provision of environmental 
services, such as cultural variety measured by a crop rotation indicator, and space for nature   7
protection such as marginal grassland, marginal arable land, and small landscape elements, 
e.g., hedges, trees, and wetlands. 
We consider a set of k = 1, 2, …, K farms that use N inputs  Î
k x ú+
N   and produce M 
desirable market outputs  Î
k y ú+
M  , I desirable non-market outputs  Î
k z ú+
I    , and  J non-desirable 
output,  Î
k w ú+
J    .
 The outputs 
k y  and 
k z  are strongly disposable, whereas the 
k w  are weakly 
disposable.  The indices of efficiency used in our analysis deal only with aspects of technical 
efficiency and not with allocative efficiency, and thus all variables can be determined in 
physical or economic units. 
To introduce the concept of technical efficiency, we first establish the convex free-
disposal hull technology involving only inputs, x, and desirable market outputs, y.  It is 
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The key concept in deriving technical efficiency is the input distance function that leads 
to radial measure of technical efficiency,  Tech q ¸ measuring the distance between the farm 
under consideration and the envelope formed as the convex hull of the efficient farms:   
{ } K k T y x
k k
Tech , ... , 1 ) , ( : min = Î = q q q
q       (2) 
When we account for weakly disposable outputs, w, then the new production technology 
is described by the set  
  ( ) { } w y x w y x TEnv and produce can : , , = .      (3)
Desirable outputs, y, and undesirable outputs, w, are distinguished by the property of strong 
and weak disposability.  While y is strongly disposable, i.e., if  Env T w y x Î ) , , (  and if  y y £ ’ , 
then  Env T w y x Î ) , ’ , ( , w is weakly disposable and thus when  S w y x Î ) , , (  and  1 0 £ £t , then 
Env T w y x Î ) , , ( t .  A reduction in the weakly disposable output can only be achieved at a cost, 
either by reducing the desirable output y or by increasing input use x. 
In this framework, Tyteca (1997) proposes three alternative environmental indices.  Two 
of them consider the unilateral reduction in non-desirable outputs and they are distinguished 
by accounting or not for inputs in the efficiency measure.  A third indicator considers the 
reduction of inputs and undesirable outputs.  This index is in particular useful in cases where 
it is meaningful to consider inputs as valuable resources.  In agricultural production, where 
most inputs, such as land use or energy-intensive mineral fertilizer, represent valuable 
resources, this latter index seems to be the most appropriate.  We thus measure environmental 
efficiency as  
( ) { } Env
k k k k
Env T w y x Î = q q q q
q , , : inf          (4) 
Under the assumption that the distance function is separable in the weakly disposable outputs 
and the technical efficiency score, this index has the convenient property that it can be   8
decomposed into an index of pure input efficiency,  Tech q , and an index capturing the effects of 
undesirable outputs (Färe et al., 1996). 
Finally, we introduce desirable non-market outputs by augmenting the vector of desirable 
market outputs, y, by the vector of desirable non-market outputs, z.  We define an amenity and 
environmental efficiency index as  
{ } K k T w z y x Env Amen
k k k k
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This index can be reduced to a pure amenity index by ignoring the effect on non-desirable 
outputs.  We call this index  Amen q  and calculate it according to   
{ } K k T z y x Amen
k k k
Amen , ... , 1 ) , , ( : min = Î = q q q








Î £ £ ³ = +











Env Amen R z z y y x x z y x T l l l l
1 1 1
& , , , : ) , , (    (8) 
Table 2 defines the variables entering vectors x, y, w, and z in the empirical analysis.  The 
desirable market outputs are measured in terms of gross revenue from animal and plant 
production activities.  Inputs are land, labor, the number of large animal units and mineral 
nitrogen fertilization.  The only weakly disposable inputs, w, entering the analysis is organic 
nitrogen, and positive amenity outputs, z, account for extensively managed land and the crop 
rotation index as an indicator of variety. 
5.  Results 
A farm survey was implemented in the spring of 2001 in the Condroz region in south-central 
Belgium.  Nine communities were chosen on the basis on similar pedo-climatic conditions.  
The region is not of any particular environmental statute, and hence, during the period March 
1999 – December 2000, farms could only qualify for vertical agri-environmental programs by 
adopting a whole farm plan for a five-year period.  We chose farms having adopted the plan 
according to the database of the local administration.  Non-adopters where chosen from a 
random sample of 200 farmers obtained from the National Statistics Institute.  In total, 28 
farms having adopted a WFP and 24 farms that have not adopted a WFP were evaluated. 
The area is characterized by silty soils and predominately cultivated by mixed crop and 
livestock farms.  In order to assure the homogeneity of the sample, farms in the process of 
converting to organic agriculture and those with large pork and broiler production were 
eliminated from the sample. Some farm characteristics of our sample are presented in table 3. 
The average farm size in the sample is about 46 ha of arable land, 33 ha of grassland. 
Livestock rearing includes dairy production and beef production.  Farms have on average 
103.5 large livestock units (LAU) of which 15 are dairy cows and 47 are suckler cows.  
Important crops include cereals, fodder maize, sugar beets, and potatoes.   9
The sample of non-adopters and adopters are fairly homogeneous but with respect to 
holdings of arable land.  Non-adopters cultivate on average 27 ha, while adopters cultivate 
about 63 ha.  This considerable difference can be explained by the interest of farmers with 
large areas of arable land for some of the vertical agri-environmental programs, such as that 
subsidizing cover crops during winter fallow. 
5.1  Agri-environmental Indicators 
Table 1 shows the results on evaluated agri-environmental indicators.  Indicators on water 
and soil protection practices show on average a better performance of adopters in comparison 
to non-adopters.  The percentage of mechanically, instead of chemically, weeded row crops is, 
despite being relatively low for both subsamples, higher for adopters.  Also the indicator on 
integrated pest management is higher for adopters. This indicator is a qualitative measure 
evaluating on a scale from 1 to 10 the quality of advice farmers seek in making their pest 
management decisions (pest forecasts, education level of pest management consultants etc.) 
The percentage of winter fallow land planted with cover crops is 59% in contrast to non-
adopters where no winter cover crops are planted.  However, this indicator is to be considered 
carefully as it does not consider the amount of fallow land during winter.  Many of the non-
adopters have lower holdings of land in arable crops, so that less land might be bare during 
winter. 
With regard to the management of nitrogen fertilizer, adopters apply less excess fertilizer 
than non-adopters.  The “crop nitrogen fertilizer” index is constructed as a weighted deviation 
of fertilization from the recommended norm and results on average as 12.8 versus 16.5 for 
non-adopters.  Animal-rearing activity is less tied to land, and the animal density per hectare 
fodder crops is 3.96 versus 3.16.  Nevertheless, the soil equilibrium indicator formed as the 
ratio of total organic nitrogen available on the farm and total organic nitrogen potentially 
applicable on the farm, results as 0.67 whereas it is 0.76 for non-adopters. The percentage of 
riverbanks protected from agricultural run-off by extensive farming practices is 79% for farms 
with a WFP and 0% for farms without WFP.
2 
As far as nature protection practices are concerned, adopters of the WFP dedicate a lower 
percentage of their grassland to marginal utilization, 3.2 % versus 7.5 %.  Marginal grassland 
is defined as grassland that the farmer uses in a less intensive way (low fertilization, lower 
grazing intensity, etc.) either because of its natural location or because of its distance from the 
farm.  
In percentage terms, less land is also dedicated to landscape elements such as hedges and 
wetlands, 9.99 versus 14.83.  However, a larger percentage of arable land is used marginally 
and cropped less intensively.  This might be due to the fact that this indicator accounts for 
extensively managed field margins.  Extensively managed field margins receive currently a 
premium 36 Euro for an area 200 m
2 and many farms having adopted a WFP have enrolled in 
this agri-environmental program. Calculating the equivalent amount of hectares managed as 
marginal arable land and grassland or dedicated to landscape elements, adopters manage 13.4 
ha as marginal land and non-adopters 9.41 ha.  Given the differences in total land holdings 
                                             
2 This indicator is statistically not very meaningful as only 11 farms in the sample have creeks crossing or 
bordering their land.  However, it gives some indication that farmers having adopted the WFP are more sensitive 
to such issues.  On the 11 farms where rivers cross or border some of the farm land, five among the eight farms 
having adopted the WFP protect 100% of the river banks, whereas 0% of river banks are protected on the 3 
farms not having adopted the WFP.   10
this amounts to 13% and 16%, respectively.   Finally, no significant differences are detected 
for the crop rotation indicator and the farm animal diversity indicator.  
In conclusion, we can state that farms having adopted a WFP perform better with respect 
to water and soil protection practices, but that these advances over non-adopters are relatively 
small.  Some nature protection practices are applied on larger shares of land, such as marginal 
crop land utilization, whereas those dedicated to marginal grassland management and 
landscape elements are more pronounced on farms not having adopted the WFP.  These 
results are in part due to agronomic differences across the farms in our sample.  Farms less 
interested in some of the vertical agri-environmental programs have not adopted the WFP that 
was a condition to access these environmental programs.  Some of the non-adopters in our 
sample possess a significant amount of land under extensive management practices whose 
inclusion in a WFP would benefit the environmental interest. 
5.2 Environmental Efficiency Analysis 
The results of the efficiency analysis are summarized for the entire sample in table 4.  
Average technical efficiency is 71% and 19% of the farms in the sample are considered as 
technically efficient.  As more outputs are included in the analysis, more farms are used to 
form the efficiency frontier and thus the efficiency indicators increase on average when taking 
not freely disposable and amenity outputs into the analysis.  The share of farms receiving an 
efficiency score of 1 increases to 29% for  Env q , 46% for  Env Amen& q , and 50% for  Amen q .  It is 
thus more interesting to compare the efficiency performance for a given indicator across 
different groups of farms rather than to compare different efficiency indicators across the 
entire sample.  Table 5 groups the results of the efficiency analysis by farm characteristics. 
We are most interested in the comparison of adopters and non-adopters of the WFP.  
Results are shown in the upper left part of table 5.  Farms having adopted a WFP (group 2) 
perform better according to all efficiency measures.  Their average score of technical 
efficiency is 0.74 versus 0.68 for non-adopters.  Looking on the one hand at the 
environmental efficiency,  Env q , their efficiency taking into account the weakly disposable 
output of organic nitrogen is at 0.91 seven percentage points higher than for non-adopters.  On 
the other hand  Amen q , the indicator taking into account amenity outputs, adopters outperform 
non-adopters with 0.78 versus 0.70.  Finally, taking both types of environmental outputs into 
account as in  Amen Env& q , the average score increases from 0.86 for non-adopters to 0.93 for 
adopters.   
We test for the significance of these differences using an analysis of variance test and the 
Wilcoxon test.  Results of both tests show that the differences among adopters and non-
adopters are at most marginally significant.  While we reject equality of the means of the 
distributions according to the analysis of variance for  Env q  and  Amen Env& q  at the 10% level, we 
reject it for  Amen q  according to the Wilcoxon test. 
Other determinants of efficiency are tested for using alternative groupings.  Grouping 
farms by their intensity measured in gross revenue per hectare shows no clear differences.  
However, grouping farms by their size measured in land holding shows significant differences 
for  Tech q  and for  Amen q .  Large farms have a significantly higher technical efficiency score and 
also a significantly higher score when accounting for amenity outputs.  Looking at the last 
comparison, we see that also farms with lower animal stocking density per hectare of land   11
have a higher average  Amen q  score.   Both these results indicate that pressure on the provision 
of marginal land and cultural variety results in particular due to smaller holdings of land, be it 
absolute as in the comparison according to farm size or relative as is the comparison 
according to animal stocking.   
6.  Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to test for the contribution of a public voluntary scheme in the 
reduction of potential negative impacts of agriculture and in the enhancement of agricultural 
provision of valuable landscape amenities.  Our analysis was based on agri-environmental 
indicators and data envelopment analysis.  Our results show that farms having adopted a WFP 
perform better with respect to water and soil protection practices, but that their improvements 
over non-adopters are relatively small.  Some nature protection practices, such as marginal 
crop-land utilization, are applied on larger shares of land whereas others, such as those 
dedicated to marginal grassland management and landscape elements, are more pronounced 
on farms not having adopted the WFP. 
For our sample of farms, farms having adopted the WFP perform better in terms of all 
efficiency indicators calculated.  However, these differences are at best marginally significant 
for our sample.  While these results are not too promising for the evaluation of voluntary 
agreements, some remarks of caution are in place.  While the VA under scrutiny in our 
analysis is a typical public voluntary scheme, it has some obliging factor in it.  Indeed, despite 
of being accessible to all farms, only those farms interested in adopting vertical agri-
environmental programs subscribed to the WFP.  Furthermore, our study was applied to farms 
that have adopted the WFP for at most two years.  Given the long-term nature of objectives 
demanding a change in farmers’ attitudes and practices, more conclusive results might be 
obtained in later years.  
One might wonder how differences between farmers with and without WFP have come 
about.  Farms with more environmentally friendly practices might be more attracted to 
subscribe to agri-environmental programs and some of these differences could have existed 
before.  But also the elaboration of the WFP and the contact with the field agent of the local 
administration would help to point out existing problems and hint to possible solutions.  
Lastly, other agri-environmental programs the farmer enrolls in influence some of the 
indicators.  Probably all of these factors play a role in explaining the observed differences and 
they are not exclusively due to the WFP. 
In our view, both the indicator method and DEA provide important information about the 
state of the environment and about farm practices and should be used as complementary 
means of analysis.  It is obvious that the indicator methods faces important drawbacks when it 
comes to aggregation issues and it is not a simple task to make sense out of a large number of 
indicators.  Data envelopment analysis overcomes these aggregation problems but faces new 
ones.  Not all types of environmental impacts that can be measured by the indicator method 
lend themselves easily for being integrated in a production possibility set.  
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Table 1.  Agri-environmental indicateurs 
  Environmental  
Benefit Benchmarks 
 




Water and Soil Protection 
Practices 
             
% of arable acreage weeded 
mechanically 






Indicator on integrated pest 
management 






% of spring crop acreage covered 
by winter cover crops 












% of arable acreage receiving 
organic matter 












Animal density in large animal 
units per hectare fodder production  






Number of times of liquid manure 
spreading during winter month 












% of river banks protected by 
extensive farming practices from 
agricultural run-off 






Nature protection practices 
 
       






% of extensively cultivated crop 
land  






Percentage of arable land dedicated 
to landscape elements 






Extensively used land in ha 
equivalents 


















Number of observations          28  24  52 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  14
 
 
Table 2.  Indicators entering the efficiency measures 








(Std.Dev.)  Tech q   Env q   Amen q
 
Env Amen& q  
Revenue from crops (¼  39,007 
(41,120) 
X  X  X  X   
Freely disposable 
outputs (y) 
Revenue from animals (¼  74,931 
(60,110) 
X  X  X  X 
Land (ha)  78.6 
(44.4) 
X  X  X  X 




X  X  X  X 
Labor (Person)  1.6 
(0.7) 





Mineral Nitrogen (kg N)  8,718.3 
(5,863.9) 
X  X  X  X 
 
Amenities (z) 
Marginal land (ha)  11.5 
(11.1) 
    X  X 
  Crop rotation indicator  5.9 
(2.3) 
    X  X 
Non-freely disposable 
output (w) 
Organic Nitrogen (kg N)  8,572.4 
(6,089.4) 




Table 3.  Economic Indicators 
  Unit  Adopters  Non-adopters  Total 
















































Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   15
 Table 4.  DEA Results 
  Tech q   Env q   Amen q   Env Amen& q  
Mean  0.71  0.74  0.89  0.88 
Standard Deviation  0.21  0.21  0.16  0.16 
Minimum  0.27  0.29  0.39  0.37 
Percentage of efficient farms  0.19  0.29  0.50  0.46 
 
 
Table 5.  Test statistics assessing the relation between efficiency measures and 
descriptive statistics
 a 
  Whole farm management plan  Intensity 
Group 
b 
Tech q   Env q   Amen q   Env Amen& q   Tech q   Env q   Amen q   Env Amen& q  
1  0.68  0.84  0.70  0.86  0.71  0.89  0.75  0.91 
2  0.74  0.91  0.78  0.93  0.71  0.86  0.73  0.88 
Analysis of variance                 
F-value  1.22  3.04  1.62  2.80  0.00  0.47  0.09  0.44 
P-value  0.27  0.09  0.21  0.10  0.96  0.50  0.77  0.51 
Significance
 a    *    *         
Wilcoxon-Test                 
Test statistics  -1.08  -1.18  -1.28  -1.16  -0.31  0.01  0.14  0.02 
p-value  0.14  0.12  0.10  0.12  0.38  0.50  0.45  0.49 
Significance      *           
                 
  Acreage  Animal Stocking LAU/ha 
Group 
b 
Tech q   Env q   Amen q   Env Amen& q   Tech q   Env q   Amen q   Env Amen& q  
1  0.64  0.87  0.68  0.89  0.74  0.89  0.78  0.91 
2  0.78  0.89  0.80  0.90  0.68  0.86  0.70  0.88 
Analysis of variance                 
F-value  5.78  0.18  4.19  0.12  1.31  0.34  1.99  0.33 
P-value  0.02  0.67  0.05  0.73  0.26  0.56  0.17  0.57 
Significance
 a  **    **           
Wilcoxon-Test                 
Test statistics  -2.16  -0.13  -1.92  -0.17  1.08  -0.07  1.34  -0.20 
p-value  0.02  0.45  0.03  0.43  0.14  0.47  0.09  0.42 
Significance  **    **        *   
a One and two asterisks indicate significance at 0.10 and 0.05, respectively. 
b The groups are defined as follows: 
-  Whole farm plan: 1: non-adopter (24 farms); 2: adopters (28 farms). 
-  Intensity: 1: revenue < 75 000 FB/ha (26 farms); 2: revenue > 75 000 FB/ha (26 farms). 
-  Acreage: 1: < 72.7 ha (26 farms); 2:  > 72.7 ha (26 farms). 
-  Animal Stocking in LAU/ha: 1: < 1.65  LAU/ha land (26  farms); 2: > 1.65 LAU/ha land (26 
farms). 